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VESTED RIGHTS AND THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT
Ray A. Brown*
HE Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 1 attempts, by new and retroactive definitions of what constitutes working time of an employee
under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,2 to deprive employees
of claims under that earlier act, to which the Supreme Court of the
United States has held 3 they were entitled. This article will discuss
whether this can be done under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.4

T

I
THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE
PoRTAL-To-PoRTAL AcT

A proper understanding of this question necessitates a review of
the legislative and judicial history which led to the enactment of the
' act here under consideration.
The Fair Labor Standards Act 5 applicable to employees "engaged
in [interstate] commerce or in the production of goods for [interstate]
commerce" provides certain minimum wages and certain maximum
hours of work. Section 7 (a) of the act 6 provides: "No employer shall
. • . employ any of his employees • • . for a workweek longer than
forty hours . • • unless such employee receives compensation for his
employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less

* Professor of Law,

University of Wisconsin.
Public Law 49, 80th Cong., 1st sess., c. 52, May 14, 1947.
2
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) §§201-219.
8
Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590, 64 S.Ct. 698 (1944);
Jewell Ridge Corp. v. Local, 325 U.S. 161, S.Ct. 1063 (1945); Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. n87 (1946).
4
The Portal-to-Portal Act also in separate sections alters the Fair Labor Standards
Act as to future claims. Since the right of Congress to alter that act as to the future
cannot be questioned, these sections of the Portal-to-Portal Act will not be discussed
herein.
5
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 201-219.
6
52 Stat. L. 1060 at 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 207.
1
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than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 7 Section I 6 of the act 8 provides that any employer who
violates the provision of section 7 "shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages,
or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages." Actions to recover
under the act "may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction." Such suits may be brought by an individual employee in behalf
of all other employees similarly situated, or the individual employee
may designate an agent or representative to bring such suits. Criminal
penalties are also added for wilful violations of the act. The · sole
pertinent clarifying provisions are the succinct statements: cc 'Employee' includes any individual employed by an employer"; " 'Employ' includes to suffer or permit to work." 9
Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local1° was a declaratory action
to determine whether the "workweek" of iron miners under the overtime pay provisions of section 7 (a) of the act included the time spent
by the miners in travelling underground from the portal of the mine
to and from the face of the vein, where the actual labor of mining
the coal was performed. The majority of the Court, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Murphy, answered this question 1n the affirmative.
Admitting that the words of the act gave no decisive answer to the
question, it said that the "issue can be resolved only by discarding
formalities and adopting a realistic attitude, recognizing that we are
dealing with human beings and with a statute that is intended to secure
to them the fruits of their toil and exertion." 11 The transportation of
men from the portal of the mine to the working face was partially in
conveyances furnished by the employer and partially ·on foot. The
trips were uncomfortable and hazardous. Such travel bore no relation to the personal needs of the miners but was for the benefit of
the employers and necessary for the conduct of mining operations.12
In the situation presented, the Court defined work or employment
as "physical or mental exertion ( whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and pri1 There are certain exceptions to this section which, however, do not affect the
problem here under consideration.
8
52 Stat. L. 1060 at 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 216 (b).
9
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 203 (e), (g).
10
321 U.S. 590, 64 S.Ct. 698 (1944).
11
Id. at 592.
12 Id. at 594-598.
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marily for· the benefit of the employer and his business." 13 Under
this definition, underground travel was held to be part of the workweek, and since such travel time had not been included in the fortyhour workweek of the employees they were entitled under the act to
over-time pay and liquidated damages. This conclusion was contested
by the employers on the ground that "immemorial custom and agreements arrived at by the practice of collective bargaining" 14 had established the time spent at the face of the workings as the "working
time" in the industry. To this contention the opinion gave several
answers. First, the trial court as a matter of fact had found to the
contrary on this issue. Second, the unions involved in the collective ·
bargaining transactions were company dominated and the agreements,
therefore, could not be treated as voluntary understandings by the
men of what constitute the workweek. Third, even if the prior
custom and practice were established, it could not control the intent
of the Fair Labor Standards Act "to achieve a uniform national policy
of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged
in by employees covered by the Act." 111 The concurring opinions of
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson take the position that what constitutes "work" in a particular industry is in its essence a question of
fact, depending upon the circumstances and common understanding
in the industry involved. The findings of fact of the district court,
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, on the question should be
accepted.16 Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Stone dissented. They
agree with the concurring justices that what constitutes compensable
"work" in a given industry depends on the understanding in that
particular industry. A lengthy review of the evidence in the case convinced them that the workweek did not include the underground
travel time and that the district court's findings of fact did not permit
the contrary conclusion.17
This case was followed by Jewell Ridge Corporation v. Local No.
6z67. 18 The district court in this case found as a fact that underground
travel time in bituminous coal mines was not included in the forty
hour workweek of the miners. The circuit court of appeals reversed
13

Id.
Id.
111
Id.
16
Id.
1
7Id.
IND. L. J.
14

598.
600.
602.
603-606.
at 606-619. The case is annotated in 30 CoRN. L. Q. II5 (1944); 20
190 (1945); 43 MICH. L. REV. 221 (1944); 7 UNIV. DET. L. J. 121
at
at
at
at

(1944).
18

325 U.S. 161, 65 S.Ct. 1063 (1945).
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on the authority of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. case. The
Supreme Court, in a five· to four decision, affirmed the court of appeals. The distinction between the two cases was that in the latter
case the underground travel was "neither painful nor unduly uncomfortable and is less hazardous than other phases of mining operations,"
and that in this case collective bargaining agreements between the
operators and the United Mine Workers, not a company controlled
union, had established the workweek as the time spent at the face of
the vein. The majority of the court adherred to the declarations of
the prior case. Neither collective bargaining agreements nor accepted
custom could affect the duty of the court to apply the Fair Labor
Standards Act uniformly. A public statement of the Wage and Hour
Administrator issued July 18, 1940 19 that he would accept the practice in bituminous coal industry of computing working time as the hours
spent at the face of the ore was summarily disposed of as "legally
untenable." 2 ° Four justices dissented from the majority decision principally on the ground that it was not the intent of the Fair Labor Standards Act to interfere with the processes of collective bargaining as
long as the agreement was not contrary to the specific provisions of
the act as to wages and hours.
These preceding cases involved situations more or less peculiar to
the mining industry. Anderson v. 1Mt .. Clemens Pottery Co.,21 the last
of the cases here to be considered, however, concerned an ordinary
manufacturing corporation and conditions typical of industry in general. The case was a suit by an individual employee in behalf of himself and his co-employees to recover overtime pay and liquidated
damages under sections 7 (a) and I 6 of the act. The employer's plant
extended over eight acres of ground and there were I 200 employees.23
Near the entrance was a time clock, at which the men checked in and
out. It took the men, however, from one-half to three minutes to walk
from the clock to their places of work. On arrival at such places an
additional three to four minutes was consumed in preparing for workputting on aprons, turning on lights, opening windows and the like.
At the close of actual work similar time was consumed by the men in
necessary postwork activity and in returning to the time clock. In
figuring the working hours of the men the employer's practice was
19

3 W. H. REP. 332 (1940).
325 U.S. 161 at 169, 65 S.Ct. 1063 (1945).
21
328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. II87 (1946).
22
Although there was a union in the plant, it did not appear that collective
bargaining had covered the method of figuring working time.
20
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to fix the time of commencing work at the nearest quarter hour subsequent- to that punched on the clock, and similarly to fix the time of
ending work at the nearest quarter hour preceding that at which the
clock was punched. The majority of the Court held that under the
definition of working time in the Tennessee Coal and Iron and Jewell
Ridge cases, the time spent by the men in walking to and from the
clock and the time spent in preliminary and postliminary working
activities must be included in the "workweek" of the employees under
section 7 (a) of the act. 28 Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissented
on the ground that, in view of the short periods of time involved, the
determination of what constitutes a "workweek" should be left to
"long established contracts or customs." They considered that, particularly in small businesses, the "special stop-watch recording'' seemingly required by the majority opinion would be "highly impractical
and the penalties ... for a neglect to do so would be unreasonable." 24
Soon following the decision of the Supreme Court in this last case,
a large number of suits were brought by employees claiming under
that decision recovery of portal-to-portal pay. The administrative
23

The opinion contains 'many interesting collateral questions not necessary to be
considered in this article. The time spent by different employees in travel ;.o and
from work and in preparing for and in closing up work varied considerably. In its
opinion, the court stated that the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex might well be
employed in some cases. "Where the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or
minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded."
(P. 692.) On remand of the case to the district court this maxim was applied in
ordering judgment for the defendant. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., (D.C.
Mich. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 710. Petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Supreme
Court on motion of the petitioners. 331 U.S. 784, 67 S.Ct. 1191 (1947). As to
this phase of the case see Veech and Moon, "De Minimis Non Curat Lex," 45 M1cH.
L. REV. 537 (1947). 46 CoL. L. REV. 883 (1946) discussd the problem of burden
of proof in such actions.
24
328 U.S. 680 at 697-698, 66 S.Ct. n87 (1946). The general problem of
portal-to-portal pay is discussed in the following articles; Smethurst and Haslam,
"'Portal-to-Portal' and Other Retroactive Liabilities," 15 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 131
(1947); Sugar, "The Truth about 'Portal-to-Portal,'" 7 LAWYER'S GUILD REv. 23
(1947); Morse, "Economic Aspects of the Portal-to-Portal Pay Question," 7 LAWYER'S
GUILD REv. 29 (1947); Ralston, "Portal to Portal Pay," 21 TULANE L. REV. 407
(1947); Cotter, "Portal to Portal Pay," 33 VA. L. REV. 44 (1947); Axley, "The
Problem of Portal to Portal Pay," (1947) Wis. L. REV. 163. Some of these authors
take diametrically opposed views as to these decisions. Messrs. Smethurst and Haslam,
counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers, and Mr. Cotter, associated
with a prominent New York law firm, abhor the decisions, particularly that in the
Mt. Clemen's Pottery case. Mr. Sugar, general counsel of the International Union
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers, approves the decisions,
criticizing, however, the Court's willingness to apply the de minimis doctrine to cases
of this character.
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office of the United States Courts reported that in the United States
courts alone between July r, r946 and January 3r, r947, r,9r3 such
suits were brought for an aggregate amount of $5,785,000,000. Of
these suits, r,r86 with aggregate damages claimed of $3,087,095,003,
were commenced in January, 1947.25 In some of such suits the damages
claimed exceeded the working capital of the defendants. 26 The employers became alarmed and several bills were introduced into Congress to remedy the situation, and also to make other changes in the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Protracted hearings were held by the
Senate and House Committees.21 In these hearings the representatives
of the employing interests claimed that the decision in the Mt. Clemens
case flagrantly misconstrued the intent of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and disregarded the common understanding of employers and
employees alike as to what constituted compensable· working time;
that this decision came as an utter surprise to both employer and employees, giving a "windfall" to the latter and threatening the former
with financial ruin. 28 Testimony of the officials of the Army and Navy
Departments of the government, and of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, indicated also that the government finances would be severely
affected because of these suits for added compensation, under cost plus
war contracts and for tax deductions under the Internal Revenue Code.
The representatives of labor, on the other hand, denied that the deci- sion in the Mt. Clemens case was any surprise to the employers. They
claimed it was clearly foreshadowed by the Court's definition of em25
See Report of Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Rep. 48, 80th Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 2 (1947). Another unofficial list recited 500 suits brought against various employers,
aggregating in claimed damages $4,383,789,610. Hearings before Sub-Committee 2,
of House Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 584 and H. J. Res. 91, 80th Cong., 1st
sess., p. 387 (1947).
26
Hearings before Sub-Co~mittee of Sen. Comm. on Judiciary on S. 70, 80th
Cong., 1st sess., pp. 49, 65, 92 (1947). The suits against twelve leading aircraft
manufacturers were said to total $461,000,000. The working capital of the defendants
was said to be but $366,365,000.
27
Hearing's, before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
80th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 70, Jan., 1947; Hearings before Subcommittee 2 of
House Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 584, 2157 and H. J. Res. 91, Feb., 1947.
28
It was contended that the suits actually commenced were but a small fraction
of those that might be brought. It was estimated that the entire amount of claim.s
possible under these decisions might aggregate forty billions of dollars. Hearings
before Subcommittee 2 of House Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 584 and H.J. Res.
91, 80th Cong., Ist sess., at p. 381 (1947). The position of industry on these bills
may be gleaned by the articles of Messrs. Smethurst and Haslam, " 'Portal to Portal'
and Other Retroactive Liabilities," 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 131 (1947), and Cotter,
"Portal to Portal Pay," 33 VA. L. REv. 44 (1947).

PoRTAL-To-PoRTAL AcT

ployment in the Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. case and by repeated
interpretations of the Wages and Hours Administrator. 29 They contended, therefore, that the plight in which industry found itself was
due to its intransigent refusal to accept the clear requirements of the
act.80 Labor also argued that the claimed danger to the employers'
financial security by the suits pending was much magnified. The
amounts stated in the suits represented merely maximum estimates
of the employees' hopes, and it was reasonable to suppose that actual
recovery would be much under the stated claims.81 Lastly, they contended that any act of Congress depriving employees of their right to
recover overtime pay, under the principles declared by the Supreme
· Court would, if retroactive, be clearly unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment.
The arguments of industry's representatives prevailed with the
majority of both the Senate and the House committees, and bills were
reported out designed to prevent employees from bringing suits against
employers based in the portal-to-portal principle. Both committees
stressed the magnitude of these suits and their possible serious e:ffect
on the economy not only of industry but of the government itself.82
The bill which was reported out, H. R. 2157, was long and vigorously
debated by Congress.88 The larger part of the argument against the
bill concerned, however, sections thereof altering certain provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act for the future, it being charged that
the employing class was seizing the present opportunity generally to
weaken that act, contrary to the interests of the working class. Few
denied that the pending and possible future suits on the portal-toportal claims were serious problems in the national economy. The bill
was passed by Congress and approved by the President May 14~
29
lnterpretive Bull. 13, United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour
Administration, contains a general discussion of what constitutes hours worked. For
some specific interpretations, see W. H. MAN., Cum. ed., 233 et seq. (1944-45).
8
°For a vigorous paraphrase of labor's testimony at the hearings, see Sugar, "The
Truth About Portal-to-Portal," 7 LAWYER'S GUILD REv. 23 (1947).
81 See Morse, "Economic Aspects of the Portal-to-Portal Pay Question,'' 7
LAWYER'S GUILD REV. 29 (1947), an attempt to estimate ,tatistically the probable
recoveries under portal-to-portal suits.
82
See S. Rep. 48, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947); H. Rep. 71, 80th Cong., 1st
sess. (1947).
88
93 CoNG. REc. 2150-2168 (March 14, 1947); 2181-2206 (March 17,
1947); 2250-2261 (March 18, 1947); 2306-2353 (March 19, 1947); 2365-2389
(March 20, 1947); 2426-2455 (March 21, 1947); 4501-4502 (May 1, 1947);
4513-4517 (May 1, 1947).
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1947.84 President Truman's message considered the bill's primary
purpose ~o be to "eliminate the immense potential liabilities which
have arisen because of the portal-to-portal claims." 85
II
THE PoRTAL-To-PoRTAL AcT

Section 1 of the act contains the "Findings and Policy" of Congress. It finds that the Fair Labor Standards Act "has been interpreted
judicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly
unexpected. liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation. . . . " The payment of such liabilities would seriously affect
the financial stability of many employers, curtailing employment, and
constituting "a substantial burden on commerce anq. a substantial obstruction of the free fl.ow of goods ip. commerce." The Public Treasury
would be seriously affected by tax refund claims and by claims under
war contracts. The "courts of the country would be burdened with
excessive and needless litigation and champertous practices would be
encouraged." As far as the employees are concerned, they "would
receive windfall payments, including liquidated damages, of sums for
activities performed by them without any expectation of reward beyond that included in their agreed rates of pay." The purpose of the
act is therefore declared to be "to meet the existing emergency and to
correct existing evils ( 1) to relieve and protect interstate commerce
from practices which burden and obstruct it; ( 2) to protect the right
of collective bargaining; and (3) to define and limit the jurisdiction
of the courts."
Part II of the act, consisting of sections 2 and 3, relates solely to
"Existing Claims." Section 2 is the decisive one: "No employer shall
be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the Walsh-Healey Act, or the BaconDavis Act 36 (in any action or proceeding commenced prior to or on or
34

Amendments by the S~nate to H.R. 2157 necessitated a conference committee
and it was the revised conference bill which ultimately passed both houses and was
signed by the President.
85
93 CoNG. REc. 5418 (May 14, 1947).
36
The Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. L. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 3545 and the Bacon-Davis Act,_ 49 Stat. L. IOII (1935), 40 U.S.C. (1940) § 276
(a) (c), provide that contracts between the government and private contractors to
furnish supplies and materials, or to construct or repair or alter public buildings, shall
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after the date of the enactment of this Act), on account of the failure
of such employer . . . to pay an employee overtime compensation,
for or on account of any activity of an employee engaged in prior
to the date of the enactment of this Act, except an activity which was
compensable by either-( I) an express provision of a written or unwritten contract in effect, at the time of such activity, between such
employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his
employer; or ( 2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time of such
activity, at the establishment or other place where such employee was
employed, covering such activitiy, not inconsistent with a written or
nonwritten contract, in effect at the time of such activity.... "
Sub-section ( c) provides that "in determining the time for which
an employer employed an employee there shall be counted ... only
that time during which the employee engaged in activities which were
compensable" as above provided. Sub-section ( d) provides that no
court, state or federal, shall have jurisidiction to enforce any liability,
civil or criminal, in respect to claims for minimum wages or overtime
pay, unless the activity for which compensation is claimed meets the
requirements set forth in section (a) above.37
It will be seen that these sections, if constitutional, preclude employees from recovering minimum wages or overtime pay in respect
to travel or activities preliminary or postliminary to productive work,
unless such travel and activities were made compensable by contract or
custom. They abrogated and are intended to abrogate the holdings
of the Court in the Tennessee Coal and Iron, the Jewel Ridge and
Mt. Clemens Pottery cases.
contain provisions as to the minimum wages, and as to the former act, maximum hours,
of the employees engaged in such contracts. In case of breach of such provisions by the
contractor the government may by suit or by withholding payments to the contractor
collect from the contractor the underpaid wages and pay the same to the employees of
the contractor. In addition, the government may cancel the contract and secure new
contracts for the supplies, the added cost, if any, to be charged against the. contractor.
The constitutional right of Congress to alter retroactively these acts is not as questionable as in the case of the Fair Labor Standards Act, since in form, at least, they amount
to mere waivers by the government of its contract rights. This article discusses, therefore, only the operation of the Portal-to-Portal Act on the Fair Labor Standards Act.
87 The above sections are the heart of the Portal-to-Portal Act as far as past claims
are concerned. Other provisions relating to past claims forbid the assignment of
claims not based on "an activity" as above defined [§ (2) (e)]; allow compromises
of claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, "if there exists a bona fide dispute"
except that the compromise cannot be based on a wage rate less than that specified
in the act; and permit the employee to waive his right to liquidated damages under
that act (§ 3). These latter provisions are to avoid Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S.
697, 65 S.Ct. 895 (1945) and Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 66 S.Ct. 925

73 2
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III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

Whether the Portal-to-Portal Act, insofar as it applied to past
claims, was within the constitutional power of Congress was extensively
considered both in committee and on the floor of Congress. Interested
parties filed memoranda presenting arguments for and against the
validity of the proposed act. This article will discuss the major ones.88

A. In General
A deep-seated antipathy to retroactive laws undoubtedly exists.
It is felt that legislation is properly directed to the future, and not to
depriving persons of rights, either in tangibles or intangibles, previously lawfully acquired. On the philosophic side, this antipathy
'

(1946), holding that claims under the act can neither be compromised nor the right
to liquidated damages waived.
Section 6 provides a new statute of limitations. The Fair Labor Standards Act
contains no statute of limitations, but the limitations applicable are those of the state
of the forum. Loggins v. Steel Construction Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 129 F. (2d)
I 18. This resulted in greater diversity. Accordingly, as to future claims the Portal-toPortal Act enacts a'two year statute of limitations (§ 6a). Past claims are barred by a
two-year statute or by the applicable state statute, whichever is shorter, provided,
however, that if the two-year statute applies, the claimant shall have I 20 days after
the enactment of the act to commence action [§§ 6 (b) (c) ]. Whether these subsections standing alone are constitutional depends on whether the courts will hold I 20
days a reasonable time in which to commence suit. See Reid v. Solar Corp., (D.C.
Iowa 1946) 6 W. H. CAs. 508, and notes, 49 A.L.R. 1263 (1927), 120 A.L.R. 765
(1939).
.
Section 9 of the act precludes recovery of claims where the employer's failure
to pay was due to good faith reliance on an administrative ruling or order.
Section I I permits a court to refuse to award liquidated damages where the
employer's failure to pay was in good faith and on reasonable grounds. If the liquidated
damages could be considered penalties, this provision would be constitutional. Norris
v. Crocker, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 429 (1851); United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly
Publications, (D.C. N.Y. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 476. However, it is held that the double
recovery provision of § 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act is not a penalty but
liquidated damages. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216
(1942).
In these ancillary provisions lurk interesting constitutional questions of which
limitations of time and space prevent discussion herein.
88
A short discussion is contained in the report of the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees, [S. Rep. 48, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 43 (1947); H. Rep. 584 and
H. J. Res. 91, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6 (1947) ]. Extensive memoranda were submitted by the National Association of Manufacturers and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations. The author expresses his thanks to these organizations for furnishing
him copies thereof. A memorandum of Dean Emeritus Henry M. Bates of the
Michigan Law School supporting the constitutionality of the proposed bill was also
inserted in the Congressional Record, 93 CONG. REc. 2306 (March 19, 1947).
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has been explained by the need to recognize and protect the social
interest in the security of acquisitions and transactions. 89 It finds expression in the provisions of the Constitution of the United States prohibiting legislation impairing the obligation of contracts and, in the
criminal field, prohibiting ex post facto laws. A not inconsiderable
number of states have constitutional provisions against retroactive
laws. 40 The doctrine that previously vested rights cannot be destroyed
by subsequent legislative acts is forcefully affirmed by Mr. Justice
Swayne in Osborn v. Nicholson 41 in the following language:
"This is a principal of universal jurisprudence. It is necessary to the repose and welfare of all communities. A different
rule would shake the social fabric to its foundations and let in a
flood tide of intolerable evils. It would be contrary to 'the general principles of law and reason' and to one of the most vital
ends of government." 42
Although, as will be later argued,43 the Portal-to-Portal Act, as
applied to its particular facts, may be sustained, the presumption would
seem to be against its validity. Numerous decisions, federal and state,
have held it beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to deprive a person of a right of action previously vested. Steamship Co. v.
J oliffe 44 was a writ of error to the California court. A statute of the
state provided that when a licensed pilot offered his services to a vessel
and his services were declined, he should nevertheless collect one-half the
scheduled fee. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court of
the United States, California repealed the statute. The Court nevertheless held that the repeal did not affect the claimant's right of recovery.
"The claim of the plaintiff below for half-pilotage fees, resting upon a
transaction regarded by the law as quasi-contract, there is no just
ground for the position that it fell with the repeal of the statute under
which the transaction was had. When a right has arisen upon a contract, or a transaction in the nature of a contract authorized by statute,
89

See Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests," 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 at 18 (1943).
See Constitution of Missouri, Art. II, § 15 (1875): "No law ••• retrospective
in its operation ••• can be passed by the General Assembly." For further references,
see 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION, 3d ed., 119 (1943).
41
13 Wall. (So U.S.) 654 at 662 (1871).
42
Id. at 662. The case, together with White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 646
(1871), held that neither a state statute nor the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting
slavery ~eprived the holder of a note, previously lawfully executed for the purchase
price of a slave, of his right to recover on the note.
48
See infra, p. 736.
44
2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 450 (1864).
40
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and has been so far perfected that nothing remains to be done by the
party asserting it, the repeal of the statute does not affect it, or an
action for its enforcement. It has become a vested right which stands
independent of the statute." 45 In Ettor v. Tacoma,4 6 a statute of the
State of Washington made the city liable for consequential damage in
grading streets, thus extending the general rule. With this statute
in force the defendant city graded a street damaging plaintiff's property. Then the city repealed the statute allowing recovery for damages.
It was held that such repeal could not prevent recovery by plaintiff
in a subsequent action. "The right of the plaintiffs in error was fixed
by the law in force when their property was damaged for public purposes, and the right so vested cannot be defeated by subsequent legislation." 41 Forbes Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners 48 was a suit
to recover canal tolls paid by plaintiff to defendant under protest,
the statute at the time exempting plaintiff from tolls. An action was
brought to recover the tolls unlawfully exacted. While the case was
still before the courts, the legislature passed a statute purporting to
validate the collection. It was held that the legislature lacked the
constitutional power to deprive plaintiff of his cause of action. Lynch
v. United States 49 was a suit to recover amounts claimed due under
a term life insurance policy issued under the War Risk Insurance Act
of 1917. The insured veteran had died while totally disabled and
under the terms of the policy, as issued, the beneficiary was entitled
to recover the face amount of his policy. Then, in 1933, Congress as
a part of a general economy measure repealed "all laws granting or
pertaining to yearly renewable term insurance." It was held that this
did not preclude the beneficiary from recovering in a subsequent suit
the amount of the insurance. ·The beneficiary had a vested contract
right with the United States, which Congress could not abrogate. 50
45
Id. at 457, 458. This decision was rendered prior to the Fourteenth Amendment and apparently rests on the contract clause of the federal Constitution. Although
this clause applies to the states and not to the federal government, it has since been
established that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress
from impairing the obligation of contracts. Ghoate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 32 S.Ct.
565 (1912); United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 256 U.S. 51 at 64, 41 S.Ct.
439 (1921); Lyuch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 at 578, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934);
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 at 353, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935); Continental
• Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648 at 680, 55 S.Ct. 595 (1935);
46
228 U.S. 148, 33 S.Ct. 428 (1913).
4
1Id. at 156.
48
258 U.S. 338, 42 S.Ct. 325 (1922).
49
292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934).
150
Other cases holding that a statute cannot abrogate previously vested rights are:
Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 654 (1871); Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul
Ry., 151 U.S. 1 at 19, 14 S.Ct. 240 (1894), right of action for tort; Choate v.
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In some of these cases the previous right was based on contract,
while the right of employees to recover minimum wages and overtime
pay is a statutory right based on the Fair Labor Standards Act. A brief
survey of the above cited authorities shows clearly, however, that the
principle forbidding retroactive annulment of previously existing rights
extends not only to rights secured by contract but also to rights acquired by non-consensual transactions. It has, however, been asserted
that when a right is based on statute, the legislature which granted
the right may even retroactively take it away. 51 California cases cited
for the proposition are based on a provision of the California Code that
all statutes are subject to repeal unless otherwise expressly provided, and
"persons acting under any statute act in contemplation of this power of
repeal." 52 Norris v. Crocker 58 and United States ex rel. Rodriguez v.
Weekly Publications/~ which have also been cited, were suits to reTrapp, 224 U.S. 665, 32 S.Ct. 565 (1912), tax exemption for which consideration
was given; United States v. Northern Pacific Ry., 256 U.S. 51, 41 S.Ct. 439 (1921),
right to select certain lands granted in consideration of construction of railroad; Perry
v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935), gold clause in United States
bonds; Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association, 297 U.S. 189, 56 S.Ct. 408 (1936),
right of shareholder in building and loan association to withdraw shares; Asiatic
Petrol. Co. v. Collector, 297 U.S. 666, 56 S.Ct. 651 (1936), right to refund of import duties based on prior statute. Similar holdings occur in state court decisions.
Existing causes of action for personal injuries ·may not be annulled or limited: Siller
v. Siller, II2 Conn. 145, 151 A. 524 (1930); Weil v. Taxicabs, Inc., 139 Ohio St.
198, 39 N.E. (2d) 148 (1942); Kay v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 65 Pa. 269 at 277
( I 870). Neither may the legislature create new causes of action if at the time of the
operative facts no such cause existed. Standard Dredging Co. v. Title Ins. Co., 96
Cal. App. 93 at 101, 273 P. 871 (1928); Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3 A. (2d)
839 (1939); Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 312 Ill. App. 73 at 83, 37 N.E.
(2d) 888 (1941); Ziccardi's Case, 287 Mass. 588, 192 N.E. 29 (1934), cert. den.,
294 U.S. 716, 55 S.Ct. 515 (1934); Philip v. Heraty, 147 Mich. 473, III N.W.
93 (1907); Hope Mutual Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483 (1866); Lewis v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 220 Pa. 317, 69 A. 821 (1908); Du:ff v. Black Diamond, 161 Tenn.
486, 33 S.W. (2d) 63 (1930); Keeley v. Great Northern Ry. Co., -139 Wis. 448
at 454, 121 N.W. 167 (1909); Quinn v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry Co.,
141 Wis. 497, 124 N.W. 653 (1910). Vested rights of property have been held
immune from retroactive laws. Coco v. Miller, 193 Ark. 999, 104 S.W. (2d) 209
(1937); Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201, 88 P. 903 (1907); Dooley v. Savannah
Bank and Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S.E. (2d) 522 (1945); Butte & Boston Con' solidated Mining Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 25 Mont. 41, 63 P. 825
(1901); Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N.W. 326 (1940); Walker v.
Nix, 196 Okla. 365, 165 P. (2d) 378 (1946); Greenough v. Greenough, II Pa. St.
.489 (1849); Brown v. Grant, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 2 S.W. (2d) 285.
51
See I SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucnoN, 3d ed., 524 (1943). Cf.,
however, p. 526, stating that this rule does not apply where the rights are vested.
52
See Political Code (Deering, 1944) § 9606; Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644,
293 P. 62 (1930); Anderson v. Ott, 127 Cal. App. 122, 15 P. (2d) 526 (1932).
58
13 How. (54 U.S.) 429 (1851).
H (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 186.
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cover statutory penalties. The penalty is imposed in the interest of the
state and not of the individual and therefore the state may at any
time prior to judgment change its policy.55 Of a similar character are
statutes authorizing condemnation of land for public purposes. The
- repeal of the statute, prior to final judgment, abrogates the right. 56 It
has also been held that grants of mere gratuities by the government
may be annuled prior to actual payment.57 The author believes that
it is not a universal or even general principle that rights based on
statute may at any time be abrogated.• Steamship Co. v. Joliffe,58
Ettor v. Tacoma,59 Asiatic Petrol Co. v. Collector 60 and many of the
state cases previously cited 61 involved claims based on statutory provisions, and yet they were held immune from abrogation. Minimum
wages and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act are not
penalties or privileges. Of course, it is a matter of public concern, and
yet their recovery indubitably enures to the private benefit of the employee. It is unlike the taking of property under eminent domain
statutes, which can be sustained only when a direct public benefit is
involved. This brings us to another argument advanced to support the
Portal-to-Portal Act.

B. . The Commerce Power
Granting the truth of the assertion in section I of the act that the
portal-to-portal suits burden interstate commerce, the situation clearly
comes within the general competence of Congress under the commerce
clause of the federal Constitution. From this it is arg1J.ed that, in order
to protect that commerce, Congress may destroy the employees' previously vested rights of action. It is of course true that rights of
property, and a cause of action is certainly no more than that, may
subsequently be restricted by legislation lying within recognized governmental powers. Thus an owner's right to use his real estate for
any purpose he may desire may lawfully be restricted by a subsequent
155
See I SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION, 3d ed., 529 (1943). The
right of an employee for double recovery under section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act is not a "penalty'' but "liquidated damages." Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel,
316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216 (1942).
56
Western Union Tel. Co. v. L. & N. R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 13, 42 S.Ct. 258
(1922).
57
In re Hall, 167 U.S. 38, 17 S.Ct. 723 (1897); Cummings v. Deutsche Bank,
300 U.S. 115, 57 S.Ct. 359 (1937).
58
2 Wall. (69 .U.S.) 450 (1864).
511
228 U.S. 148, 33 S.Ct. 428 (1913).
60
297 U.S. 666, 56 S.Ct. 651 (1936).
61
See note 50, supra.
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zoning law, even though the effect may be to diminish the value of
his property.62 The continuation of existing property uses, found to
be detrimental to the public health and safety, may also under the
police power be prohibited. 63 In cases of this type, however, the legislation does not, as does the Portal-to-Portal Act, attempt to take
away all the owner's rights to his property, but merely limits his
enjoyment of them in the future. It may be granted that the question
is one of degree, but in constitutional law, questions of degree often
determine the point at issue. Cases are extremely rare which sustain
complete destruction of private rights, even though a public purpose
may be served thyreby. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 64 a coal
company had leased its surface rights to coal lands, expressly reserving
the right to mine the coal and providing that the surface lessee assumed
the risk of any damage resulting therefrom. Then the Pennsylvania
legislature passed a statute forbidding all mining of anthracite coal
which caused the subsidence of dwellings owned by others. The Court
held the statute unconstitutional. The effect of it was to deprive the
owner of the coal of all its value. When a statute goes that far, the
state must proceed under eminent domain, paying for what it has
taken. 65 The recent case of Fleming v. Rhodes 66 does seem at first
glance, however, to support the right of government to abrogate completely existing rights of action. In the interim between the expiration
of the Emergency Price Control Act on June 30, 1946 and the enactment of the Price Control Extension Act, on July 25, 1946, a landlord
secured a judgment for eviction of his tenant. On the enactment of
the later act, the price administrator brought a bill to enjoin the landlord from ehforcing his judgment. The Court sustained the injunction.
It was held unnecessary to consider the retroactive features of the
Extension Act. The action of the administrator was merely as to future
proceedings. "Federal regulation of future action based upon rights
62

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926).
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 35 S.Ct. 511 (1915) (livery stable);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915) (brick yard).
64
260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158 (1922). The opinion by Justice Holmes states
excellently the proposition stated immediately above by this author.
65
ln Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246 (1928), however, the court
sustained a Virginia statute requiring the destruction of red cedar trees, which communicated a rust to apple orchards, a valuable industry of the state. The case does
show that the police power may extend to complete and uncompensated destruction of
private property, but it should be noticed that the cedar trees were physically destroying the apple trees. There is presented, therefore, something of an analogy to the
abatement of a nuisance.
66
331 U.S. 100, 67 S.Ct. 1140 (1947).
63
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• previously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by the
Constitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently
enacted legislation, the fact that the provisions limit or interfere with
previously acquired rights does not condemn it. Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts. Were it
otherwise the paramount powers of Congress could be nullified by
'prophetic discernment.' The rights acquired by judgment have no
different standing." 67 Taken literally, the above language sustains
section 2 of the Portal-to Portal Act, which merely prevents courts in
the future from entertaining jurisdiction of suits based on the congressionally repudiated portal-to-portal suits. $uch an inference, however, would almost completely nullify the protection the court has
thrown about property rights under the due process clause. The effect
of most of the statutes held unconstitutional because retroactively
destroying previously vested rights 68 is merely to prevent future actions to enforce them. 69 But the value of a right of action depends
entirely on the power to enforce it. Taking away the remedy destroys
the right, and as will be seen below, many statutes directed in words
at the future remedy have been held unconstitutional for that reason.
The true explanation of Fleming v. Rhodes seems to be this. Neither
the Emergency Price Control Act of I 942, nor the Price Control
Extension Act of r 946, took away from the landlord all his property
in the leasehold. They limited those rights by fixing the rents he
could charge and his right to repossession. The validity of such emergency legislation is established.70 The judgment that the landlord
had obtained in this case merely affirmed these rights and was no more
immune from this over-riding power of Congress than were his original
rights. Therefore, the decision does-not necessarily sustain the Portalto-Portal Act, which does not merely limit the employee's right. It
destroys it. 71
It is well settled that rights obtained by private contracts between
67

For this last, the court cited Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S.
502, 58 S.Ct. 1025 (1938), holding that § 75 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act constitutionally permitted the extension of the period of redemption from a mortgage foreclosure even though resting on a prior judgment for foreclosure.
68
See supra, pp. 733-736.
69
See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158 (1922).
70
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458 (1921); Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641 (1944).
71 Fleming v. Rhodes may also have been influenced by the circumstance that
when the landlord received his judgment for eviction it was generally known that
Congress would extend the Price Control Act. The landlord's "forehanded" attempt
to thwart subsequent legislation may not have been regarded as an interest deserving
much protection.
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individuals, though expressly protected by the contract clause of the
Constitution,72 may be abrogated by subsequent legislation lying within
granted governmental powers. Thus a gold clause in railroad bonds
was held nullified by the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, enacted
under the power of Congress to regulate the currency.78 Also, a contract between a railroad and an injured employee granting the latter
a lifetime pass could not be enforced when Congress later under the
commerce clause prohibited a pass of that nature. 74 These decisions,
however, rest on considerations not applicable to the rights of action
vested in the employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
contract cases rest on the sound proposition that individuals by private
contracts cannot secure exemption from the general operation of
subsequent legislative enactments under undisputed governmental
powers.75 The right of employees to recover minimum wages and
overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act is not based on contract with the employers, but on the act of Congress. That this is an
important distinction is shown by Perry v. United States 78 holding
that gold payment clauses in the government's own bonds may not
be abrogated by Congress.77
C. Emergency Legislation
The Portal-to-Portal Act ( section I) declares an emergency, and
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell 1 8 supporting mortgage moratorium legislation is relied upon to support the annulment
72

See supra, note 45, for cases holding that the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment prevents Congress from impairing the obligation of contracts.
78
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407 (1935).
74
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, ~19 U.S. 467, 31 S.Ct. 265
(1911). Other illustrative cases are: Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 26 S.Ct.
127 (1905) (contract relating to dam on public waters); Hudson County Water Co.
v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct. 529 (1908) (contract for diversion of public
waters); Philadelphia, B. and W. R.R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 32 S.Ct. 589
(1912) (contract to accept benefits of welfare fund in lieu of suit for personal injury);
Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, 248 U.S. 372, 39 S.Ct.
117 (1919) (contract as to public service company rates); Sproles v. Binford, 286
U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581 (1932) (contract for carriage of goods on public highways).
75
See Hughes, J, in Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603
at 613-614, 32 S.Ct. 589 (1912). "To subordinate the exercise of the Federal authority to the continuing operation of previous contract, would be to place, to this extent,
the regulation of interstate commerce in the hands of private individuals and to withdraw from the control of Congress so much of the field as they might choose, by
prophetic discernment to bring within the range of their agreements."
76
294 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935).
77 This was declared by the Court though recovery was denied on other and
somewhat dubious grounds.
78
290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231 (1934).

74°

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

of the portal-to-portal suits. The Blaisdell case does not go that far,
however. In the first place the mortgage moratorium statute there
sustained was for the period of the emergency only, while the Portalto-Portal Act is a permanent enactment. In the second place the
mortgage moratorium statute did not destroy the mortgagee's right
to collect his debt, or to take the mortgaged property in satisfaction
thereof. It merely postponed it, the mortgagor in the meantime being
required to pay a reasonable rent. Emergency rent regulation sustained in Block v. Hirsh 79 and in Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman 80 was of similar limited duration and operation. When socalled emergency legislation has been of indefinite operation, or when
it has operated to destroy and not merely postpone a right it has been
declared unconstitutional. 81 The Portal-to-Portal Act is of permanent
operation and it destroys and not merely postpones the portal-to-portal
suits. The Blaisdell decision -does not support it.
The writer does not contend that the government, acting under
its police powei- or in an emergency may never destroy previously
vested property rights. The common law recognized that private
property could be demolished without right to compensation, when
necessary to stop a confiagration.82 Disease-spreading red cedar trees
could. also be cut down to save the dominant apple industry. 88 Yet
these are exceptional cases. In general, the Fifth Amendment provides
that private property sp.all not be "taken" for public use without compensation. This applies even to a taking under the war power.84 Unless
the portal-to-portal claims come, as the author believes, under the
qualification made below,85 if it is necessary to preserve commerce and
the public treasury that these claims be destroyed, the government,
and not the individual claimants should stand the cost.
79
256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458 (1921).
so 256 U.S. 170, 41 S.Ct. 465 (1921).
81
W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 54 S.Ct. 816 (1934), state statute
exempting proceeds of life and disability insurance policies from seizure under judicial
process unanimously held unconstitutional when applied to prior debts; Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854 (1935), FrazierLemke amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, depriving mortgagee of right to hold lien
until debt is paid, and of right to have mortgaged property sold at public sale at which
mortgage could bid, unanimously' held contrary to due process of law; Treigle v.
Acme Homestead Assn., 297 U.S. 189, 56 S.Ct. 408 (1936), state statute depriving
members of building and.. loan association of previously granted rights to withdraw
their shares held unconstitutional.
82
Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879).
83
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246 (1928).
84
United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 623 at 628 (1871); Omnia Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 at 508, 43 S.Ct. 437 (1923).
85
See infra, p. 745.

PoRTAL-To-PoRTAL AcT

74 1

D. Jurisdiction of Courts
The Portal-to-Portal Act attempts to achieve its ends by denying
jurisdiction to both federal and state courts of suits for minimum wages
and overtime compensation, unless the claims are based on contract or
custom as provided in section 2(a) of the act.86 It is true that under
Article III of the Constitution Congress has the power to regulate
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.87 It also seems that Congress
may limit the power of state courts to deal with claims based on federal
statutes. 88 These principles, however, cannot sustain the present enactment. In the first place, the Portal-to-Portal Act is not a jurisdictional
act, but a direction to the courts to decide suits for minimum wages
and overtime compensation by specified criteria. The distinction is
shown by United States v. Klein. 89 Klein sued the United States in the
Court of Claims for the value of certain property taken by the Union
armies during the Rebellion. The statute permitted such suits where
it was shown that the claimant had not aided the Rebellion. In the
instant case, Klein had given aid, but had subsequently been pardoned
by the President. The Court of Claims entered judgment for claimant
relying on the pardon to wipe out claimant's previous disability. While
the case was pending on appeal Congress enacted that the pardon
should not authorize a recovery and that the Supreme Court should
have no jurisdiction of the appeal, unless it were shown that the
claimant had never aided the enemy. The Supreme Court, however,
took jurisdiction of the appeal. The Act of Congress was not a jurisdictional act but an attempt to prescribe how the court should decide
the case. This Congress could not do. The Court took jurisdiction and
affirmed the court below.90
86

See supra, p. 730.
McNulty v. Batty, 10 How. (51 U.S.) 72 (1850); Ex parte McCardle, 7
Wall. (74 U.S.) 506 (1869); In re Hall, 167 U.S. 38, 17 S.Ct. 723 (1897);
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 at 234, 43 S.Ct. 79 (1922), dictum.
88
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641 (1944).
89
13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 128 (1871).
90
"Undoubtedly the legislature has complete control over the organization and
existence of that court [i.e., the Court of Claims] and may confer or withhold the
right of appeal from its decisions. . ••
"But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold
jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose is to deny
to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court has adjudged them
to have. The proviso declares that pardons shall not be considered by this court on
appeal.•.•
"The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point; but when it ascertains
that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to
dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.
"It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Con81
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Payne v. Griffin 91 is also persuasive. This was a suit in the district
court for damages for violation of regulations under the Emergency
Price Control Act. The defendant contended that the act was unconstitutional. The plaintiff replied that section 204 ( d) of the act took
from the court jurisdiction to consider its constitutionality. This, Judge
Deaver denied, saying: "A district court can entertain only such cases
as Congress gives it jurisdiction to try. Jurisdiction to try any case
may be withheld altogether. But once Congress confers jurisdiction to
try a case, it cannot withhold power to decide the case aceording to
the applicable law. . . . The distinction is that, while Congress can
determine what cases a court can try, it cannot direct what law shall
control the decision." 92 The Portal-to-Portal Act does not take away
from the courts jurisdiction to try claims for wages. It prescribes how
they must be decided.
In the second place, if a claimant's right to recover a previous
tj.aim is a vested right, it cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation, as was held in Steamship Co. v.'Joliffe,98 Ettor v. Tacoma, 94 and
comparable cases.95 It is clear that the legislature may not abrogate
that right by the simple device of denying to its courts jurisdiction to
enforce the claim. In Angel v. Bullington,9 6 the defendant, a citizen
of North Carolina, had given notes secured by a mortgage on Virginia
land to plaintiff, a citizen of the latter state. The mortgage was foreclosed by power of sale and a deficiency resulted. The plaintiff brought
suit in a North Carolina court to recover the deficiency. That state,
however, had a statute providing that, when mortgaged property had
been sold under power of sale, the mortgagee "should not be entitled to
a deficiency judgment' on account of such mortgage." The North
Carolina court 97 held for the defendant on the ground that the state
of the forum had denied to its courts jurisdiction of such suits. The
Supreme Court of the United States held the statute of North Carolina
unconstitutional as applied to the situation. "A State cannot escape its
constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction
gress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power." United
States v. Klein, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 128 at 145-146 (1871).
·
91
(D.C. Ga. £943) 51 F. Supp. 588.
92
Id. ·at 591.
93
2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 450 (1864).
94
228 U.S. 148, 33 S.Ct. 428 (1913).
95
See, supra, notes 48-50.
96
330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657 (1947).
97
Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E. (2d) 4u (1941).
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in such cases to Courts otherwise competent." 98 The North Carolina
court "could not put a federal claim aside, as though it :were not in
litigation, by the talismanic word 'jurisdiction.'" 99 It is also a fundamental tenent of constitutional law that state statutes taking away, or
seriously restricting the remedy to enforce previous contracts are unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts.10° For similar
reasons the Frazier-Lemke Act of Congress was unconstitutional under
the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment.101 BrinkerhoffFaris Co. v. Hill 102 clearly shows that the government may not deprive a claimant of an existing cause of action by denying to its courts
jurisdiction of the cause. The plaintiff brought a bill in the lower
court of Missouri to restrain the collection of certain taxes claimed
to violate equal protection under the federal Constitution. Such a
suit was a recognized remedy under the state decision then in effect. On
the appeal, however, the Supreme Court of the state held, reversing
the prior decisions, that the bill would not lie, because the plaintiff had
an adequate remedy by petitioning the State Tax Commission for relief.
In a unanimous decision the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the plaintiff had been denied due process of law. "Whether
acting through its judiciary or through its legislature, a State may not
deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a
right, which the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was,
afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it." 108 We repeat,
that if it is held that the right of employees to recover claims arising
under the Fair Labor Standards Act as construed by the court in the
98

330 U.S. 183 at 188, 67 S.Ct. 657 (1947).
Id. at 189. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 4n, 40 S.Ct. 371 (1920);
McKnett v. St. Louis and S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 54 S.Ct. 690 (1934); Broderick
v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S.Ct. 589 (1935), all involving the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution are in accord.
The actual decision in the principal case was for the defendant on the ground
that the North Carolina judgment was res judicata.
100
White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (So U.S.) 646 (1871), in this case the constitution .
of Georgia provided: "no court or officer shall have-jurisdiction to tty or give judgment on or enforce any debt the consideration of which was a slave or the lien thereof'';
Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 535 (1867); W. B. Worthen v. Thomas,
292 U.S. 426, 54 S.Ct. 816 (1934).
101
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854
(1935).
102
281 U.S. 673, 50 S.Ct. 451 (1930).
103
Id. at 682. In Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 33 S.Ct. 428 (1913), the
Court also said (p. 156): "The necessary effect of the repealing act •.. was to deprive
the plaintiffs in error of any remedy to enforce the fixed liability of the city to make
compensation. This was to deprive the plaintiffs in error of a right which had vested
before the repealing act, a right which was in every sense a property right."
99

744

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 46

Mt. Clemens Pottery case is a·vested right, Congress may not abrogate
it by the simple device of withholding from all courts jurisdiction to
enforce such claims. D~e process of law in the Fifth Amendment places
the same limitations on Congress in this respect as the Fourteenth
Amendment, the full faith and credit and the contract clause place on
the state legislatures. 104

E. The Judicial Power
Protestants of the constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act
have contended that the above discussed feature represents an attempt
by Congress to exercise judicial powers, and so violates the doctrine
of separation of powers implicit in the federal Constitution. Reliance
is had on Justice Holmes's often cited definitions of judicial and legislative powers in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line: "A judicial inquiry
investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present
or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. . . . Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter.... " 105 Because
Part I of the act relates to situations arising prior to its enactment, the
conclusion is drawn that it is an unconstitutional exercise of judicial
power by Congress. This will not do. Such a conclusion would invalidate all retroactive legislation. As will shortly be seen, retroactive
legislation is often sustained.
A more serious contention is that the act in question is an attempt
by Congress to prescribe to the courts how and on what criteria they must
decide suits pending before them. In United States v. Klein just discussed 100 the Supreme Court struck down the act of Congress which
directed the courts not to consider in pending claims the e:ffect of the
President's pardon.· The Court held that this attempt of Congress to
10

"' Cases cited to support this power are distinguishable. Where the suit is against
the state or the United States, the right to sue may be abrogated, since a sovereign
gov_ernment may at any time withdraw its consent to be sued. Lynch v. Uni~ed States,
292 U.S. 571 at 581, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934). The portal-to-portal suits are not against
the United States. In re Hall, 167 U.S. 38, 17 S.Ct. 723 (1897) did not involve
a vested right but a gratuity. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 506 (1869) did
not take away all right to sue but merely the right to appeal, and the right to appeal
is not a constitutional right. Similarly, Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64
S.Ct. 641 (1944) did not take away the right to contest the orders of the Price
Administrator. It restricted that right to proceedings before the Emergency Court
of Appeals.
105
2JI U.S. 210 at 226, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
10a Supra, p. 741.
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dictate the court's basis of judgment was unconstitutional.101 So in
the instant statute Congress is endeavoring to direct the courts in
pending suits to eliminate from consideration all activities of employees not included in the "workweek" by contract or custom. Viewed
solely in this light the Portal-to-Portal Act may well fall. But that
act is not merely a direction to the courts how to decide existing action.
Section 2 108 also prescribes a general rule. It is an act of legislation,
even though retroactive. If not invalid, because of due process of law
requirements, the court must apply it. Certainly the doctrine that
forbids the legislative body to prescribe to •the courts how they must
decide pending causes of action does not preclude the legislature from
changing the law. The power to make law rests with the legislature
and, in theory at least, not in the courts. In a number of the cases
to be considered in the next subsection of this article it will be found
that the courts have frequently applied, even in pending litigation,
new rules of law promulgated by the legislature.109

F. "Equitable'' Considerations
Although, as we have seen, retroactive statutes, that is, those
applying to past transactions, are inherently suspect, and when they
deprive persons of previously "vested rights" are generally invalid,110
it by no means follows that all retroactive statutes are unconstitutional.
So-called curative statutes, which validate retroactively defects in previous real estate transfers; in transactions of private and municipal
corporations; in tax levies; and even in judicial proceedings are exceedingly common and have been generally upheld. 111 It has been
held also that new statutes, which validate contracts, invalid when entered into because of non-compliance with some legal requirement, are
107
In reference to the Klein case the Court has recently said [Pope v. United
States, 323 U.S. I at 8, 65 S.Ct. 16 (1944)] "Decision was rested upon the ground
that the judicial power over the pending appeal resided with this Court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, and that Congress was without constitutional authority
to control the exercise of its judicial power and that of the court below by requiring
this Court to set aside the judgment of the Court of Claims by dismissing the suit."
108
Supra, p. 730.
109
Reference may be here made to the holding under the Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins doctrine that the federal courts, even in the course of litigation must apply
new state court decisions changing previous doctrine. Can it be contended that the
state courts are dictating to the federal courts the manner in which they are to decide
particular cases? See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 64 S.Ct. 1015 (1944).
110
See supra, pp. 732-736.
111
See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3d ed., 136-160 (1943)
for a collection of cases.
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neither impairments of the obligation of contracts nor contrary to due
process of law. In McNair v. Knott, 112 a national bank had deposited
with a state, securities to secure the deposit with it of state funds. Doubt
was raised whether such deposits were not ultra vires under the
national banking statutes. To remove the doubt Congress passed a
retrospective statute affirming the power of the banks to make such
deposits. The bank, however, brought suit to recover the deposits
made, claiming that they were ultra vires and illegal when made, and
that Congress could not retroactively make them legal. The Supreme
Courf rejected the contention. "Placing the stamp of legality on a
contract voluntarily and fairly entered into by parties for their mutual
advantage takes nothing_ away from either of them. No party who
. has made an illegal contract has a right to insist that it remain permanently illegal.-No person has a vested right to be permitted to
evade contracts which he has illegally made." 113 Retroactive legislation has also been held constitutionally adequate to annul pending
causes of action, and even judgments, by the operation of the ratification principle. Thus a claim to. recover taxes levied ultra vires by a
subordinate governmental unit was held legally abrogated by a later
act of the higher legislative body ratifying the act of the subordinate.114
Since, therefore, some retroactive statutes are unconstitutional deprivations of property, and some are not, the question is whether any
principle exists to determine which -is which.115 The writer believes
that a principle, simple in statement though somewhat difficult in application, does exist. If the retroactive statute defeats claims based on
the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time the legal transaction occurred, the statute constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation
of property without due process. On the other hand, if the statute
112

302 U.S. 369, 58 S.Ct. 245 (1937) •.
Id. at 102. See also Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 380 (1829);
Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 88 (1834), holding such statutes not to impair
the obligation of contracts.
114
United States v. Heinszen, 206 U.S. 370, 27 S.Ct. 742 (1907). See also
New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644 (1877); Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 33 S.Ct.
585 (1913); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 43 S.Ct. 435 (1923).
In Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 64 S.Ct. 1215 (1944), the Court
held that the Wage and Hour Administrator who had made an ultra vires regulation
as to coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act could retroactively substitute a new
and valid regulation which would govern the claim then under litigatioq. See also
Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575
(1947).
.
115
See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3d ed., u7-129 (1943);
Smith, "Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights," 5 TEX. L. REV. 231 (1927), 6 TEX.
L. REV. 409 (1928), where the question is discussed.
118
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merely carries out those reasonable expectations it is valid.116 Somewhat less analytically it has been said that retroactive statutes are valid
when they are not "contrary to the justice and equity of the case." 117
These principles are proven and exemplified in the decided cases.
It will be noticed that in some of the cases the effect of the retroactive
statute is to defeat an existing cause of action. In others the effect is
to deprh:e a party of a defense to the action, which, but for the
statute, he would have had. From the constitutional standpoint the
writer sees no distinction between the two types of statutes. In both
cases the ultimate effect is to deprive the party affected of money or
other property. Practically speaking, it is immaterial whether the
injury is inflicted by depriving the party of a previously existing claim,
or whether its effect is to impose upon him a liability, which but for
the statute, he would not have had.
Goshen v. Stonington 118 is the pioneer case. It appeared that in
Connecticut many persons in good faith and in supposed compliance
with the statute of the state, had had marriages solemnized by ordained
but itinerant ministers. Later "on a close investigation of the subject,
under the prompting scrutiny of interest, it was made to appear, that
there had been an honest misconstruction of the law...•" 119 Only
marriages performed by clergymen "settled" in a particular locality
were legal. Then the legislature passed a statute validating such marriages, the effect of which, in the instant case, was to impose upon the
defendant township liability for the support of a pauper, which but for
the statute would not have rested on it. The court upheld this retroactive law, saying: " • . . laws of a retroactive nature, affecting the
rights of individuals, not adverse to equitable principle, and highly
promotive of the general good, have often been passed, and as often
approved." 120 The purpose of the statute was "to quiet controversy,
and promote the public tranquility." It was within the power of the
legislature "to furnish a remedy coextensive with the mischief." 121
116

Cf. McNair v. Knott, 302 U.S. 369, 58 S.Ct. 245 (1937).
See 2 CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 771, 784 (1927);
Smith, "Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights," 5 TEX. L. REv. 231 at 247 (1927),
6 TEX. L. REv. 409 at 427 (1928).
118
4 Conn. 209 (1822).
119
Id. at 226.
120
Id. at 221.
121
Id. at 226. See Wistar v. Foster, 46 Minn. 484, 49 N.W. 247 (1891),
sustaining statute validating deed of a supposed single woman which was invalid when
made because the divorce which she had obtained was void for lack of proper publication. The court observed (p. 486) that the statute "merely g~ves effect to the inten117
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Another leading case is Danforth v. Groton Water Co. 122 The
plaintiff brought action against defendant for the taking of certain
water rights. Judgment was entered for defendant because the plaintiff had not complied with the statute by applying to the county commissioners for an assessment of damages. While the case was pending
on appeal before the Supreme Court the legislature enacted a statute
providing that no pending action should be dismissed solely on the
ground that no prior application had been made to the commissioners.
The court in an opinion by Justice Holmes sustained the statute and
plaintiff's claim. The claim was a just one. The defendant's defense
was based on a technicality, and the Court, quoting from Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations,1 28 said "a party has no vested right in a
defense based on an informality not affecting his substantial equities." 124
The recent Supreme Court case of Chase Securities Corp. v.
Donaldson 125 both in decision and in the language of the opinion is
pertinent. The action was to recover the purchase price of. securities
tion of the parties, and enforces an equity by simply taking away the right of the party
to avoid his contract."
There are contrary decisions holding that it is beyond the power of the legislature
to validate previous void conveyances: Ramey v. Pyles, 182 Ark. 320, 31 S.W. (2d)
533 (1930), three dissents and contrary to earlier Arkansas decision; Thweatt v.
Bank of Hopkinsville, 81 Ky. I (1883); Greenough v. Greenough, II Pa. St. 489
(1849), both holding the statutes unconstitutional interferences with the judicial
power; Merchants Bank v. Ballou, 98 Va. II2, 32 S.E. 481 (1899), a third party had
secured a lien on the land.
122
178 Mass. 472, 59 N.E. 1033 (1901).
128
2 CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 771, 784 (1927).
124
Id. 477. Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How. (56 U.S.) 494 (1853). A partition
sale of land had been made by the Orphan's Court. Later the Supreme Court of
the state held that such a sale was invalid because the conveyance was not to the bidder,
but to his nominee. A later statute validating the sale was upheld, though the effect
thereof was to defeat an action to set aside the deed. West Side Belt R. Co. v. Pittsburgh Construction Co., 219 U.S. 92, 31 S.Ct. 196 (19n). A suit by a foreign
corporation had been dismissed because the corporation had not at the time the cause
of action arose been admitted to do business in the state. Then the legislature passed
a retroactive statute authorizing a suit in spite of the original infirmity. Held, that
under the new statute, the corporation could sue. Goddard v. Frazier, (C.C.A. 10th,
1946) 156 F. (2d) 938, cert. den., 329 U.S. 765, 67 S.Ct. 124 (1946). Certain
Indian lands had been. sold by the court in partition proceedings brought by the heirs.
Later the Supreme Court of the United States held that such a sale was void, because
the United States had not been made a party to the action. Pending suit by the heirs
to quiet title, Congress enacted a statute :validating such partition sales. Judgment was
entered for defendants. ''Where the object and effect of the curative statute is to
'correct an innocent mistake, remedy a mischief, execute the intention of the parties,
and promote justice, then as a matter of right and of public policy, the law is constitutionally valid." (P. 942.)
'
125
325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. n37 (1945).
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which had been sold the plantiff without having been registered under
the Minnesota Securities Act. The Supreme Court of the state, reversing the lower court, held that the action was barred by the then existing statutes of limitation. While the case was pending on remand,
the legislature lifted the bar of the statute, and judgment was then
rendered for plaintiff. The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the statute, even though it deprived the defendant of his previously judicially sustained defense, was not contrary to due process.
A statute lifting the bar of the statute of limitations is not unconstitutional.126 The Court quotes with approval Justice Holmes opinion in
Danforth v. Groton Water Co.: 121 "The Fourteenth Amendment does
not make an act of state legislation void merely because it has some
retrospective operation. What it does forbid is taking of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. . . . Assuming that statutes
of limitation, like other types of legislation, could be so manipulated
that their retroactive effects would offend the Constitution, certainly
it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitations so as to
restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense
against the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor has the appellant pointed out
special hardships or oppressive effects which result from lifting the
bar in this class of cases with retrospective force. This is not a case
where appellant's conduct would have been different if the present
rule had been known and the change foreseen. It does not say, and
could hardly say, that it sold unregistered stock depending on a statute
of limitation for shelter from liability. The nature of the defenses
showed that no course of action was undertaken by appellant on the
assumption that the old rule would be continued." 128
126 When title to land has been acquired by adverse possession for the period of
the statute of limitations the result is doubtless different. It is so assumed in Campbell
v. Holt, II5 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209 (1885).
127 178 Mass. 472, 59 N.E. 1033 (1901).
128 325 U.S. 304 at 315, 65 S.Ct. 1137 (1945) (italics supplied). The opinion
re-affirms Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209 (1885), also sustaining
statute lifting bar of statute of limitations. Mulligan v. Hilton, 305 Mass. 5, 24 N.E.
(2d) 676 (1940) is in accord. Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 60
S.Ct. 600 ( I 940), sustained on similar grounds a private act of Congress ordering
the Employees Compensation Commission to re-open a claim for compensation, though
the same had previously been decided against claimant and the statute of limitations
had run.
Previous usury statutes relieving the borrower from paying legal interest, may also
be retroactively abrogated. The lender may then recover legal interest since this was
not contrary to the intent of the borrower. Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143, 2 S.Ct. 408
(1883); Mechanics Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97 (1859). This latter case is similar
to the portal-to-portal situation in that at the time of the transaction there was honest
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The general principle of these cases is well expressed in the Ohio
Constitution 129 which after prohibiting "retroactive laws" provides
that·the legislature "may, by general laws. authorize courts to carry
into effect, upon such terms as may be just and equitable, the manifest intention of the parties, and officers, by curing omissions, defects
and errors in instruments and proceedings arising out of their want of
conformity with the laws of this state."
Although the above-cited decisions sustained statutes retroactively
abrogating defenses, statutes have also been sustained which have
abrogated previously existing causes of action. In McFadden v. EvansSnider-Buel Co.130 one A, in Indian Territory had given a chattel
, mortgage on certain cattle. Under existing law this mortgage was void
because A was not a resident of the territory. In that situation the
plaintiff, a prior judgment creditor of A, although he had knowledge
of the mortgage, attached the cattle for his debt. Then Congress passed
an act validating the chattel mortgage, thus depriving plaintiff of his
attachment. The Court upheld the act of Congress and the judgment
below giving priority to the mortgage. The plaintiff was not a bona
fide purchaser. He parted with no money or other property in reliance
on the· 1nvalidity of the mortgage. Graham v. Goodcell 1 31 involved
suits to recover of the United States taxes alleged to have been collected illegally. A statute of Congress banned the collection· of taxes
after five years from the date of the return, and provided that taxes
paid thereafter could be recovered by the taxpayer. At this time there
was uncertainty whether this statute prohibited collection of taxes by
the distress process, and many taxes, not shown to be illegal per se,
were collected under this process. Then the Supreme Court held that
the limitation did apply to collections by distraint. Accordingly, actions
were brought by taxpayers to recover the taxes so paid. In this juncture
Congress passed an act prohibiting such suits. The Court held the
statute valid. After reviewing former decisions the Court said: "It is
apparent, as a result of the decisions, that a distinction is made between
a bare attempt of the legislature retroactively to create liabilities for
doubt whether under the applicable law the charges were usurious. Brearley School
v. Ward, 201 N.Y. 358, 94 N.E. 1001 (19II), sustains a New York statute retroactively subjecting to execution property previously exempt. The court said, at p. 372,
that "a party has no vested right in a defense to a contract which he has actually
made and which he-is under a moral obligation to perform, though the law at the time
makes such contract void."
·
129
Art. II, § 28 (1851).
180
185 U.S. 505, 22 S.Ct. 758 (1902) .
131
•
I
28:z U.S. 409, 51 S.Ct. 186 (1931).
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transactions which, fully consummated in the past, are deemed to leave
no ground for legislative intervention, and the case of a curative statute
aptly designed to remedy mistakes and defects in the administration of
government where the remedy can be applied without injustice. Where
the asserted vested right, not being linked to any substantial equity,
arises from the mistake of officers purporting to administer the law
in the name of the Government, the legislature is not prevented from
curing the defect in administration simply because the effect may be
to destroy causes of action which would otherwise exist." 132 Decision
was therefore rendered for the defendant.1 ,ss
Another example of retroactive statutes supported on grounds of
reason, equity and justice occurs in connection with the occupying
claimant statutes. At the common law the successful claimant of land
secured not only the land but profits and the improvements placed
thereon by the adverse possessor. Mills v. Geer 134 sustained a retroactive occupying claimant's act depriving the plaintiff of these ancillary
rights. The common law doctrine enabled the recoverer of the land
to "reap the fortune placed upon it and turn the purchaser out a
pauper." The retroactive statute "is not an interference with private
property, is remedial in its nature for the purpose of enforcing natural
right and equity."m
National Carloading Corporation 'V. Phoenix El Paso Express 136
which has been frequently cited in support of the Portal-to-Portal
Act, is in line with the principles herein discussed. The plaintiff, express
company, brought an action, as was its right and duty, to recover the
difference between the charge collected for carriage, and the higher
charge which it claimed its tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce
Id. at 429.
Cf. People ex rel. Beck v. Graves, 280 N.Y. 405, 21 N.E. (2d) 371 (1939),
holding unconstitutional a retroactive interpretative amendment of the tax laws. The
dissent of Lehman, Crane and O'Brien is in accord with the "equitable" principles
of the cases here discussed.
134
III Ga. 275, 36 S.E. 688 (1900).
135
Id. at 289. See accord: Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303 (1810); Fee v.
Cowdry, 45 Ark. 410 (1885).
See Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Powers, 296 Mich. 553, 296 N.W. 675
(1941), sustaining a retroactive statute providing that where a suit was brought to
collect the deficiency resulting from a mortgage foreclosure sale, the debtor could
set off against the deficiency the difference between the sale price and the actual
value of the land. The court said, ·at p. 561: "No one has a vested substantive right
to more than his due."
186
142 Tex. 141, 176 S.W, (2d) 564 (1944), cert. den., 322 U.S. 747, 64
S.Ct. II56 (1944).
132
133
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Commission required. The lower charge had been made under joint
tariffs filed by the defendant, a freight forwarder. Subsequent to the
charge the United States Supreme Court held that freight forwarders
were not under the Motor Carriers Act, with the result that the lower
tariff of the forwarder was voided. The plaintiff's action was therefore properly grounded. Pending the suit, however, Congress amended
the act, expressly validating retroactively the tariffs previously filed
by the forwarders. The court held that the statute constitutionally
defeated the plaintiff's action. Although many of the reasons given
in the opinion for supporting the statute are broader than the authori-.
ties sustain, the decision is justified by the reason that Congress has
authority "to validate voluntary transactions between parties which
at the time they were entered into were by statute invalid or
illegal. . . . " is1

IV
CONCLUSION

It is the writer's opinion that the principles of the cases just disc~ssed will support _the Portal-to-Portal Act. This conclusion is dependent, however, on sustaining the "findings" in section one that
the Court's interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act was contrary to "long established customs, practices, and contracts between
employers and employees" and resulted in imposing "wholly unexpected liabilities" on the employers and in conferring on the employees
"windfall payments, for activities performed 9y them without any
expectation of reward..... " 1138 It is clear from the cases that the
mere fact that the Portal-to-Portal Act takes away the employee's
causes of action does not necessarily make it unconstitutional.139 Statutes
imposing on defendants liabilities for which they were previously
free have also been sustained and, as has been said, the fundamental
constitutional objection to retroactive legislation is the same in both
types of stat~tes. The author believes that the distinction between the
unconstitutional and the constitutional retroactive statute is as we have
187

Id. at I 50.
See also in accord the memorandum of Dean Bates introduced in the Congressional debate, 93 CoNG. REc. 2306 (March 19, 1947).
189
See Mcfaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel Co., 185 U.S. 505, 22 S.Ct. 758
(1902); Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 51 S.Ct. 186 (1931); National Carloading Corporation v. Phoenix Express, Inc., 142 Tex. 141, 176 S.W. (2d) 564
( I 944), and the other cases referred to in the notes to these cases.
138
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indicated. In Steamship Co. v. Joliffe,1 40 Ettor v. Tacoma, 141 Forbes
Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners 142 and Lynch v. United States 143
the liability of the obligee was clear under the existing law. The
claimants had "reasonable expectations" that the obligation would
be fulfilled. In the cases supporting the constitutionality of the retroactive statutes, on the other hand, the claimants, or defendants as the
case might be, did not at the time of the transactions involved, reasonably rely on the claims or defenses which the retroactive statutes struck
down. Therefore, in the language of the opinions it was not inequitable
or unjust to deprive them thereof. This is particularly illustrated
by the National Carloading Corporation case. The Phoenix Express
charged the defendant what it reasonably expected was the lawful
tariff. By subsequent judicial decision it transpired that it had a claim
for a larger sum. The retroactive act of Congress depriving it of this
larger claim was not therefore unconstitutional. Again, assuming that
Congress is right as to the unexpected character of the portal-to-portal
claims, the analogy of the case is perfect.
The Portal-to-Portal Act in section 2,1 44, seems based squarely on
the distinction drawn. · If the "activity" of the employee was compensable either by contract or custom, then the Portal-to-Portal Act
does not affect it, and minimum wages and overtime pay can be collected. If neither by contract nor custom was the activity regarded as
compensable then pay therefore could not reasonably have been expected, and recovery of minimum wages and overtime pay cannot be
had. Under the decided cases this seems permissible.145
The writer claims no special competence to decide whether the
portal-to-portal cases, particularly the Mt. Clemens Pottery decision 146 did, as section I of the Portal-to-Portal Act affirms, impose
"wholly unexpected liabilities" upon the employers and reward the
employees with "windfall payment," or whether, as opponents of the
140

2 Wall. (69 {!.S.) 450 (1864).
m 228 U.S. 148, 33 S.Ct. 428 (1913).
142
258 U.S. 338, 42 S.Ct. 325 (1922).
us 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934).
Supra, p. 730.
By a literal following of the words of section 2 it would be possible for an
employer by contract to exclude from compensable worktime, activities of his employees,
which were clearly for the employer's benefit and entitled to compensation. The
legislative history of the act shows, however, that Congress's inte~t was merely to cover
the doubtful situations presented in the portal-to-portal cases. The act can reasonably
be so interpreted. See the message of President Truman accompanying his approval
of the act, 93 CoNG. REc. 5418 (May 14, 1947).
m 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. u87 (1946).
l4¼
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act asserted,147 the liabilities, which the portal-to-portal suits seek to
enforce should clearly have been foreseen. Doubtless the courts can
give weight to the' Congressional finding that the former represents
the true state of a:ffairs.148 Also the very circumstance that portal-toportal suits aggregating over five billion dollars in claims followed
immediately after the decision of the Mt. Clemens case on June ro,
I 946 seems to indicate that the employees then, for the first time,
realized the treasure that lay before them. Doubtless also the courts
will not be insensible to the claimed injury to the economy of industry
and the government that would result should these claims succeed.
The writer will not, however, attempt the role of a prophet. He
merely states his belief that, should the Supreme Court be so minded,
ample grounds exist to support the retroactive feature of the Portalto-Portal Act.149
147

Supra, p. 728.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, 58 S.Ct.
778 (1938).
149 The Portal-to-Portal Act has been considered by many United States District
Courts and has been uniformly sustained on varying grounds. Burfeind v. EaglePicher Co., (D.C. Tex. 1947) 6 W. H. CAs. 929; Cochran v. St. Paul & Tacoma
Lbr. Co., (D.C. Wash. 1947) 7 W. H. CAS. 13; Story v. Todd Houston Corp.,
(D.C. Tex. 1947) 7 W. H. CAs. 99; Darr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1947) 7 W. H. CAs. 227; Hornbeck v. Dain Mfg. Co., (D.C. Iowa 1947) 7 W. H.
CAS. 296; Quinn v. California Shipbuilding Corp., (D.C. Cal. 1947) 7 W. H. CAs.
310; Hart v. Aluminum Co., (D.C. Pa. 1947) 7 W. H. CAS. 320; Seese v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., (D.C. Md. 1947) 7 W. H. CAs. 332; Local 626 v. General Motors
Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1947) 7 W. H. CAs. 366; Elting v. North American Aviation,
(D.C. Kan. 1947) 7 W. H. CAs. 491; Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., (D.C. Minn.
1947) J° W. H. CAS. 507; Holland v. General Motors, (D.C. N.Y. 1947) 7 W. H.
CAS. 530; Moeller v. Eastern Gas Associates, (D.C. Mass. 1947) 7 W. H. CAS. 556;
Plummer v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., (D.C. Minn. 1948) 7 W. H. CAs. 662;
Battery Workers' Union v. Electric Co., (D.C. Pa. 1948) 7 W. H. CAs. 687; Role
v. Neils Lumber Co., (D.C. Mont. 1947) 7 W. H. CAs. 771; Bateman v. Ford Motor
Co., (D.C. Mich. 1948) 7 W. H. CAs. 789. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has upheld sections 9 and I I of the act. Rogers Cartage Co. v. Reynolds,
7 W. H. CAs. 694 (Feb. 16, 1948). The Second Circuit has refused to consider the
constitutionality of the act on procedural grounds. Larsen v. Wright, 7 W. H. CAs.
851 (March 30, 1948). However, a city court of New York has held the act unconstitutional. Curtis v. McWilliams Dredging Co., 7 W. H. CAS. 757 (Feb. 26, 1948).
See 60 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1947).
148

